Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

1974

The Individualization of Excusing Conditions
George P. Fletcher
Columbia Law School, gpfrecht@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Law and Philosophy Commons

Recommended Citation
George P. Fletcher, The Individualization of Excusing Conditions, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1269 (1974).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/1023

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more
information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu.

THE INDIVIDUALIZATION OF
EXCUSING CONDITIONS
GEORGE P. FLETCHER*

I.

THE CONCEPT OF EXCUSING

The excusing conditions of the criminal law are variations of the theme
"I couldn't help myself' or "I didn't mean to do it."' In this respect
the defenses known as necessity, duress, insanity and mistake of law
are but extensions of homely, routine apologies for causing harm and
violating the rules of social and family life. While we use the plea
"I couldn't help myself" to cover the full range of excusing circumstances, each of the formal excuses of the criminal law has a limited
sphere. As a general matter, these spheres are dictated by the type
of circumstances rendering the conduct excusable. If the excusing
circumstances are natural phenomena, the appropriate excuse is necessity.2 Standard cases are those of the starving man who steals a loaf
@ Copyright 1974, by George P. Fletcher.
Dedicated to the students of the University of Southern California Law Center,
Class of 1974, Section A, in the hope that they will infect others with their love for
ideas.
* Professor of Law, University of California at Los Angeles. B.A. 1960, University of California at Berkeley; J.D. 1964, University of Chicago; M. Comp. L. 1965,
University of Chicago. Visiting Professor of Law, Harvard University, 1973-74.
1. Blackstone perceived the essence of excuses to be the "want or defect of
will." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARmS *20. The subject of excuses has received
little attention in the contemporary literature of the common law, but it has been of
interest to philosophers. See Austin, A Plea for Excuses, in PROC. ARSTOTELIAN SOc'Y
1 (1956-57), reprinted in FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY 6 (H. Morris ed. 1961);
H.L.A. Hart, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, 60 PROC. AmUsTOTLmtN
Soc'y 1, 13, 17-24 (n.s. 1959), reprinted as the first chapter in H.L.A. HAAT, PUNISHMENT AND REsPONsiBILrrY (1968) [hereinafter cited as HAnT].
2. This is a good rule-of-thumb, (see W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CnnsNAL LAw
381 (1972)), but it admits of exceptions. The German Penal Code of 1871
§ 54 [hereinafter cited as STGB] regulates the defense of necessity (Notstand); STGB
§ 52 regulates duress (N~tigungsstand). Yet § 54 does not by its terms exclude
threats emanating from human beings; and the courts have held the provision applicable to cases of human threats falling below the threshold required for self-defense
under STGB § 53. See Judgment of July 12, 1966, 1966 NEua JUISTISCHE WOCH-NscHRr 1823 (Bundesgerichtshof, Germany); Judgment of July 12, 1926, 60 Entschei-
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of bread or the shipwrecked sailor who dislodges another man from
the only life-sustaining plank at sea. If the excuse derives from intimidation exerted by another human being, the appropriate excuse is
coercion or duress.' Thus, if the actor steals or rapes only because
a gunman threatens to kill him if he does not, the defense of duress

would come to play. In a third type of case, the distortion in the
actor's conduct is attributable neither to natural circumstances nor to
another human being, but to his own psychological make-up. It is
here that we speak of legal insanity as a defense.

Whether the form-

ula of insanity is the restrictive M'Naghten rule4 or the more liberal Durham test,5 the inquiry is the same: Is there something about the defendant's psychological condition that makes it credible for him to say,
"I couldn't help myself.""
The excuse of mistake of law warrants special notice. An individual might engage in seemingly innocuous conduct, such as carrying
a pocket knife, and find himself in violation of the criminal law. Nothing compels him to carry the knife.

If he has an excuse, it would

dungen des Reichsgerichts in Strafsachen 318 [hereinafter cited as RGSt..
In the
new Criminal Code, effective January 1, 1975 [hereinafter cited as STGB 1975], the
legislature consolidated necessity and duress under one provision, thus rendering irrelevant the distinction between responses to human threats and responses to natural pressure. STGB § 35, Law of July 4, 1969 (Zweites Gesetz zur Reform des Strafrechts),
[1969] Bundesgesetzblatt I 717 [hereinafter cited as BGBI.]; as amended (postponing
the date of coming into force until January 1, 1975), Law of July 30, 1973 (Gesetz
fiber das Inkrafttreten des Zweiten Gesetzes zur Reform des Strafrechts), [1973] BGBI.
1 909. Cf. FRENCH PENAL CODE § 64 [hereinafter cited as C. PN.] (covering cases both
of necessity and duress).
3. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARmS *30 (considering duress per minas as a species of necessity); STGB § 52; MODEL PENAL CODE § 209 (Proposed Official Draft
1962). The French Penal Code has only one provision, C. PAN. § 64, which regulates
both necessity and duress (excusing anyone "compelled to act by a force that he could
not resist.") The Soviet Criminal Code does not provide for either duress or necessity
as excuses. It provides only for the justification of lesser evils which covers a subset
of the cases of necessity and duress. R.S.F.S.R. 1960 UGOL. KoD. [CRnM. CODE] § 14.
See text accompanying notes 62-67 infra.
4. M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843). The test is whether
at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was laboring under
such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature
and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it that he did not
know he was doing what was wrong.
Id. at 722.
5. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954), holding that an
accused should not be held "criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product
of mental disease or defect." Id. at 874-75. This test was rejected in United States
v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972), and replaced by the standard proposed
in MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).

6. There is another view of what the insanity defense is about; see text accompanying notes 74-80 infra.
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be that he "didn't mean" to violate the law. In this type of case,
the distortion of the actor's conduct derives not from internal or external pressures, but from ignorance-ignorance that might be beyond
his control.
These four excusing conditions bear several common traits. They
all speak in the idiom of involuntariness. The claim is not that there
was no act at all (as if the actor suffered an epileptic seizure), but
that the actor, in Aristotle's words, "would [not] choose any such act
in itself."'7 Were it not for the conditions of necessity, duress, insanity
or ignorance of the law, the actor would not have violated the law.
Therefore, his act seems to be attributable to circumstances rather
than to his character. The act does not tell us what kind of person
the actor is. The premise seems to be that if a violation of the law

does not accurately reveal the actor's character, it is unjust to punish
him for what he has done."

According to this account, the practice of excusing men for their
deeds is interwoven with a felt distinction between condemning the
act and blaming the actor. It is always actors who are excused, not
acts. 10 The act may be harmful, wrong and even illegal, but it might
not tell us what kind of person the actor is. And precisely in those

cases in which there is no reliable inference from censuring the act
to censuring the actor, we speak of excusing the actor for his misdeed."1
7. ARiSTOTLE, ETHICA NICOMACSEA llloa (W.D. Ross transl. 1925) [hereinafter
cited as ARUSTOTLE].
8. With regard to the rationale of punishment and its just distribution, the text
follows H.L.A. Hart's position in HART, supra note 1. As adapted in the text, the
chain of reasoning is: (1) Punishment is just only if its distribution is just; (2) the
just distribution of sanctions presupposes an allocation of burdens according to the desert of the offenders; (3) the desert of offenders is a function of their character, as
manifested in committing a legally prohibited act; (4) in a case of excused conduct,
one cannot determine the character of the offender; and (5) it is unjust, therefore,
to punish excused offenders.
9. This distinction is explored in Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory,
85 HAnv. L. REV. 537, 558-60 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Fairnessand Utility].
10. The close connection between excusing and the personal position of the actor
has caused some confusion in common law thinking. It induced Blackstone to treat
excuses as questions pertaining to the specification of the "persons capable of committing crimes."

4 W. BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIEs *20 (title to chapter treating ex-

cuses). See also CAL. PENAL. CODE § 26 (West 1970).
11. In previous papers, I have argued that the issue of excusing is equivalent to
the inquiry whether the accused is morally culpable for violating the law. See, e.g.,
Fletcher, The Theory of Criminal Negligence: A Comparative Analysis, 119 U. PA.
L. REv. 401, 417-18 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Criminal Negligence]. Cf. H.

1272

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:1269

II. THESIS: THE COMMON LAW'S AVERSION TO
EXCUSING CONDITIONS
If this account of excusing conditions seems plausible, it is nonetheless
a view that has hardly won favor among English and American jurists.
German scholars and courts have cultivated a full range of excusing
conditions, but common law courts have been loath to recognize necessity, duress, insanity and mistake of law as defenses relating to the
character of the doer rather than to the quality of the deed. If they
have recognized these defenses at all, it is only after converting the
claims of excuse into other types of defenses. Necessity and duress
sometimes emerge as justificatory defenses; that is, as claims that the
act is right and commendable, rather than that the actor should be
disassociated from wrongful conduct. Mistake of law occasionally slips
by as a defense, but only as a denial for the special mental state required for conviction; common law courts rarely, if ever, ask whether
the defendant's ignorance of the law was beyond his control and therefore excusable. Even insanity, which is universally recognized as a
defense, is often taken not as an excuse, but as a jurisdictional challenge to the court-something akin to the defense of infancy.
Even where common law courts and legislators recognize defenses like duress as excuses, they nonetheless shy away from equating
the issue of excuse with an assessment of the actor's character. Thus,
even reform-minded forces like the Model Penal Code tie the defense
of duress to the expected conduct of the "person of reasonable firmness"
rather than to the individual character of the accused."2 The "reasonable man" is so familiar a figure of common law rhetoric that he
is hardly out of place in the Model Penal Code. Yet, as will become
clear in the course of the analysis that follows, the common law reliance on "reasonable men" relates to the system's more general aversion to excusing conditions.
PACKER, THE Limrrs OF rH CRIMNAL SANCTION 103-31 (1968). This may generally
be true, but the link between moral culpability and excusability breaks down in cases
of civil disobedience. See, e.g., United States v. Kroncke, 459 F.2d 697 (8th Cir.
1972) (seizing and destroying draftee registration cards to protest the war in Vietnam).
If the act of civil disobedience is morally sound, it is difficult to argue that the violation renders the actor morally blameworthy. Indeed he may be morally praiseworthy.
Yet according to the thesis of the text, he should not be excused. Precisely because
the violation is an act of moral witness, it tells us what kind of person the actor is.
It thus bears little resemblance to involuntary acts, where the act is attributable to circumstances rather than the actor's character. Thus, if civil disobedience is to count
as a defense, one should have to search elsewhere for a rationale.
12. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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The ensuing sections focus in detail on the common law's abuse
and transformation of four excusing conditions: necessity, duress, insanity and mistake of law. I shall devote special attention to the first;
for the variations of necessity are complex and the comparative history
of necessity in German and Anglo-American jurisdictions illuminates
the difference between justifying and excusing criminal conduct.
In conclusion we shall turn to an account of the common law's aversion
to excusing conditions. To anticipate that account briefly, I shall attempt to show that this feature of the common law derives from misleading assumptions about the indispensability of rules in formulating
legal judgments.
A.

NECESSITY: TH

PROTOTYPICAL AMBIGUITY

The byways of necessity are so intricate that we need a roadmap of
the possible types of case. At least four landmarks stand out in the
variations of necessity: (1) the harm threatened; (2) the harm done
by the actor in eliminating the threat; (3) whether the actor acts in
his own interest or in the interest of others; and (4) whether the danger emanates from the object damaged or from another source. Let
us examine these four variables in greater detail.
The harm threatened. The interest threatened might be life,
health, sexual integrity, property or personal liberty. For example,
a man's life might be in danger if he is starving, a pregnant woman's
life or health might be endangered by the fetus, or an individual's
home might be in the path of a raging fire.
The harm done. The actor can eliminate the danger only by
inflicting harm on another interest. To pursue the same examples,
the starving man can save his life by stealing food, a doctor can save
the mother's life or health by aborting the fetus, and the homeowner
can save his home only by blasting a firebreak to contain the fire.
The status of the actor. Someone must decide whether the threatened interest should prevail over the interest that would need to be
sacrificed. Sometimes, as in the case of the starving man, the decision-maker is the person whose interests are at stake. At other times,
as in the case of the doctor aborting the fetus, the decision-maker
is a non-involved third party.
The source of the risk. The harm inflicted by the necessitated
act 'sometimes accrues to the source of the danger, as in the case of
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aborting a fetus, and sometimes to an interest independent of the danger, as in the case of stealing a loaf of bread to avoid starvation. It
is obviously difficult to distinguish neatly between these two kinds of

interests. If a house is blown up to check the spread of a fire, it might
be viewed under either rubric. One might argue that either the fire
or the continuing presence of the house is the true cause of the danger. This distinction raises familiar philosophical quandaries about the
difference between causes and conditions.13

With these variations of necessity in mind, we can begin to probe
the most troublesome aspect of necessity as a defense, namely, its capacity to function now as a justification and now as an excuse. When
necessity figures as a justificatory rationale, the issue is whether, on
balance, the act is right or wrong. 4 The rightness of the act typically
turns on a comparison of the utility of acting (the value of the interest
saved) with the disutility of acting (the value of the interest sacrificed).
Rightness is thus a matter of maximizing utility, or furthering the
greater good. 15 This is the view of necessity-indeed the only view
13. This distinction proves to be significant in assessing tort liability for justifiably causing harm. The German Civil Code distinguishes between causing harm to
an object that is the source of the danger, BGB § 228, and intruding upon property
to avoid a risk emanating from a distinct source, BGB § 904. In the former case,
which German lawyers call defensive necessity, the conduct is justified and the actor
is liable in tort only if he caused the risk and was at fault in doing so. In the
latter case, called aggressive necessity, the actor is liable in tort regardless of his
role in bringing on the risk. There is substantial evidence that the common law
of tort has responded intuitively to the same distinction. Compare Vincent v. Lake Erie
Transp. Co., 109 Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 221 (1910) (liability for aggressive necessity:
damaging a wharf to avoid the risk of destruction at sea), with Putnam v. Payne, 13
Johns. 312 (N.Y. 1816) (no liability for shooting a mad dog in the streets). The conventional rationale for these two categories of cases in the common law is that there
should be no liability where the destructive act serves the public interest. W. PROsSER,
LAw OF TORTS 125 (4th ed. 1971). The distinction between public and private
necessity correlates with the German distinction based on the source of the risk, i.e.,
cases of public necessity generally are directed to the source of the danger. But cf.
Surocco v. Geary, 3 Cal. 69, 58 Am. Dec. 385 (1853) (no' liability for blowing up
house to prevent spread of fire; a case of public necessity where the harm arguably
did not accrue to the source of the risk).
14. For further elaboration of the concept of justification, see HART, supra note
1, at 13-14; Fairnessand Utility, supranote 9, at 558-60.
15. This merger of the standard of Right (Recht) with the calculus of utility
is by no means uncontroversial. The Reichsgericht adopted this position in a groundbreaking decision of March 11, 1927, recognizing an extra-statutory justification of
lesser evils, 61 RGSt. 242, 254. The difficulty with this position is that it leads to
justifying the killing of innocent persons where necessary to save a greater number of
lives. The alternative theory, which seeks to unify all justificatory defenses under one
heading, maintains that conduct is justified if and only if it is "the appropriate means
for achieving a legally recognized objective." A. zu DOHNA, Din REcATswDnioKmT
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of necessity-that has crystallized in the Model Penal Code 6 and in
7
the Soviet codes and literature.'
The following cases are readily justified as cases of necessity (of
furthering the greater good):
1. A starving man steals a loaf of bread.' 8
19
2. A doctor aborts a fetus to save the life of the mother.

3. A homeowner blows up a house to prevent a fire from spreading
and destroying many other houses.

20

4. A policeman kills a lunatic who is shooting wildly and uncontrol21
lably into a crowd of people.
5. Three desperate shipwrecked sailors select a fourth to be sacri22
ficed and eaten so that the three may survive.

In all of these cases, the decisive factor is determining that one

interest (the starving man's life, the mother's life, etc.) should prevail
over the other (the grocer's property interest, the life of the fetus,
etc.), and that determination is made simply by asking which interest
is worth more. The decision has nothing to do with the personality

or character of the actor. In principle, the decision may be abstracted
48 (1905). The Reichsgericht rejected this formula as vague and likely to generate
questionable results. Id. at 253. But cf. STGB 1975, § 34 (including this test as a
limitation on the defense of lesser evils).
16. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). The commentaries to the code suggest that the problem of necessity as an excuse should be faced
in drafting a provision on duress. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02, Comment at 8
(Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958). But the provision on duress, § 2.09, is limited to "threats."
See text accompanying notes 63-65 infra.
17. See R.S.F.S.R. 1960 UcOL. KOD. ICrM. CODE] § 14; 2 Kuns SOvETsKOGo
UOGOLNOGO PRAVA [Course in Soviet Criminal Law] 380-92 (A. Piontovskij, C. Romashkin, V. Chkhikvadze, eds. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Kuas].
18. This is a recurrent problem in the theory of necessity. See M. HALE, PLEAS
op Tan CnowN 53-54 (1680) (denying the defense in cases of starvation); ef. Judgment of the Court of Appeals in Amiens, France, April 22, 1898, [1899] S. Jur. II. 1
(affirming an acquittal of a starving woman who stole bread to feed herself and her
starving child).
19. See, e.g., Judgment of the Reichsgericht, Mar. 11, 1927, 61 RGSt. 242; The
King v. Bourne, [1939] 1 K.B. 687.
20. See, e.g., Surocco v. Geary, 3 Cal. 69, 58 Am. Dec. 385 (1853).
21. There is some dispute whether this type of case should be considered one
of necessity or self-defense. See Fletcher, Proportionalityand the Psychotic Aggressor:
A Vignette in Comparative Criminal Theory, 8 ISRAEL L. Rav. 367, 373-74 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Psychotic Aggressor] (discussing common law and French tendencies
to regard the danger posed by a psychotic as a problem of necessity).
22. This is the classic situation posed in Regina v. Dudley & Stevens, 14 Q.B.D.
273 (1884).
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from the individual case to formulate a new rule of law: any time
an actor is faced with this same conflict of values, he may legally and
properly choose the value the court has preferred.
The theory of necessity becomes muddled when we note that most
of these five cases also lend themselves to interpretation as cases of
excused, rather than justified conduct. In cases (1), (3) and (5),
one might think of the actor as surrendering to overbearing pressure
rather than as furthering the greater good. Starvation causes a man
to steal; the threat of destruction causes a homeowner to blow up the
neighboring house; and the fear of imminent death causes sailors to
cannibalize one of their number. As the inquiry moves from justification to excuse, the emphasis shifts from assessing the act in abstraction
to assessing the actor's response to unusual circumstances. The relevant question is no longer whether other people should act the same
way in the same situation, but whether this defendant can be justly
blamed for having succumbed to overwhelming pressure.
Now one might properly note that the question whether an actor
may be fairly blamed for yielding under the circumstances is very
much like comparing the utility and disutility of counteracting impending harm. If a man inflicts great harm to avoid a slight injury to himself, he would be hard-pressed to show that his conduct was involuntary. Whether conduct appears to be involuntary depends, in part,
on the competing interests at stake.3 Yet it would be a mistake to
suppose that perceptions of involuntariness are tantamount to judgments that the act furthers the greater interest. For conduct to be
excused as involuntary, it is neither necessary nor sufficient that the
actor act to further the greater good. If the actor's life is at stake
and he must kill an innocent man in order to survive (e.g., he must
dislodge another shipwrecked sailor from the only plank at sea), he
does not act to further the greater good, for the two competing lives
are of the same value. Nonetheless, his instinctive effort to save his
life would presumably be excused. 4
23.

This point is recognized in the German literature. H.

JESCHECK, LEURBUCH

DES STRAFRcirrs 317 (1969); H. WELZEL, DAS DEUTSCHE STRAFRECHT 180 (11th ed.

1969). The relationship between excusing and balancing interests is thoughtfully developed in an opinion of the Reichsgericht, Judgment of Nov. 11, 1932, 66 RGSt. 397:
[Olne can formulate the general proposition that excusing a serious crime,
such as perjury, requires a more significant and persistent invasion of bodily
integrity than required for excusing a lesser crime.
Id. at 400.
24. Kant refers to this case as one in which the act is not punishable though
culpable (or at least not free from culpability). I. KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 41-42 (J. Ladd transl. 1965).
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Conversely, acting to further the greater good does not in itself
generate an image of involuntary conduct.2 5 Suppose a farmer shoots
and kills moose attacking his crops.2 6 The value of the crops may
well exceed the value of the several moose, but it does not follow
that the shooting was involuntary. The question of involuntariness
turns on the competing interests at stake, but the question is always
whether the impending harm is so great relative to the cost of acting
that we cannot fairly expect the actor to abstain from acting and suffer
the harm. The comparison of interests is but the vehicle for determining what we may rationally and fairly expect of the actor under the
27
circumstances.

There may be substantial overlap in the applicability of the theories of necessity, as in cases (1), (3) and (5) above, but it is impor25. Indeed the fact of furthering the greater good is likely to make the actor's
choice appear to be responsive to rational and balanced reflection, rather than the pressure of circumstances. Therefore the range of involuntary, excused conduct is limited
at both ends: (1) the harm cannot unduly exceed the cost (if it does, the actor is
subject to blame for yielding to the pressure of the situation), and (2) the benefit
should not exceed the harm (if it does, the conduct is more likely to appear voluntary,
and the appropriate rationale for acquittal is justification, rather than excuse). But
note cases like Minard, Judgment of the Court of Appeals, Amiens, France, Apr. 22,
1898, [1899] S. Jur. II. 1 (starving mother stealing loaf of bread), where the benefit
clearly exceeded the cost, yet the conduct also seemed to be patently reflexive and
involuntary.
26. This is the problem posed in Cross v. State, 370 P.2d 371 (Wyo. 1962). The
court introduced the defense of necessity under the rubric of an implied constitutional
right to do everything "reasonably necessary to protect one's property." Id. at 377.
But note that the defense recognized might be functionally closer to German Civil
Code BGB § 228 (defensive necessity), see note 13 supra, than to MODEL PENAL
CODE § 3.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (lesser evils). The difference between the two defenses lies in the extent to which the defending party is permitted
to cause harm in excess of the value of the interest protected. BGB § 228 justifies conduct if the harm is "not disproportionate" to the value of the interest protected; MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 would apply only if the harm is less than the interest
being protected.
27. It is important to recall the difference between physical involuntariness and
the evaluative dimension of involuntariness discussed in the text. English usage on
this point is not clear. In discussing excuses, including duress, H.L.A. Hart notes,
"most people would say of them that they were not 'voluntary' or 'not wholly voluntary.'" HART, supra note 1, at 14. In contrast, Glanville Williams insists that cases of
coerced and necessitated conduct are voluntary so long as there is any choice at all to
yield to the pressure of circumstances. G. Williams, The Defense of Necessity, 6 CTJRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 216, 223 (1953). Aristotle notes that cases of this class are voluntary in one sense, "but in the abstract perhaps involuntary." ARiSTOTLE, supra note
7, at ll0a. The distinction between the two dimensions of involuntariness is captured
neatly by the French differentiation between la contrainte physique and la contrainte
morale. See, e.g., 1 P. BOUZAT & J. P1NATEL, TRArrA DE DRorr PbNAL ET DE
CRUMNOLOGm 343, 348 (2d ed. 1970).
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tant to note that there are three traditional areas where only one theory of the defense applies. These areas warrant our attention, for

they establish the indispensability of both theories of necessity in a
well-developed system of criminal theory.
The first area is typified by cases (2) and (4) above.

Whenever

the decision-maker is a third party, like the doctor who must decide
whether to perform an abortion, the only relevant doctrine of necessity
is that of justification. A finding of involuntary conduct is precluded
because the actor's personal interests are not at stake. 28
There are two important types of case in which the only available
defense of necessity might be a claim of excuse. The first is the case

in which the actor takes human life, perhaps even to save a greater
number of human lives. One might divert a river to flood a town
and kill innocent people in order to save a large city from destruction.
Or in the classic situation posed in Regina v. Dudley & Stevens, a

group of shipwrecked sailors, facing imminent death, might cannibalize one of their number so that the rest may survive.20 If these cases
did not involve the sacrifice of innocent lives, they would be readily

justified as instances of furthering the greater good.
of life has traditionally posed special problems.

But the taking

German scholars, in-

fluenced by the Kantian tradition, have rejected the possibility of justification where the act is one of killing an innocent person.8 0 And
28. The theory is obviously that a close personal tie with the victim is one factor
tending to render the intervention involuntary. Limiting the scope of a defense to dependents and relatives is a sign that the theory of the defense is one of excuse, rather
than justification. Compare StGB §§ 52 and 54 (necessity and duress limited to
dependents), with StGB § 53; R.S.F.S.R. 1960 UGOL. KOD. [Clam. CODE] § 13
(self-defense applicable to save the interests of all third parties). But cf. CAL.
PENAL CODE § 197(3) (West 1970), where the range of permissible intervention ("wife,
or husband, parent, child, master, mistress, or servant") suggests that the common law
theory of the scope of defense of others might well have been the identity of interests within the manor or household, rather than the involuntariness of the defensive
c nduct.
29. 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884). The historical context of the case is thoughtfully
treated in Comment, In Warm Blood: Some Historical and Procedural Aspects of
Regina v. Dudley and Stevens, 34 U. CAr. L. R v. 387 (1967); Simonson, Der "Mignonette" Fall, 5 ZErrscmuFr ft DIE GESAMTE
sTRAFRaEswissENscHAFr
367 (1885).
30. One approach to this type of problem is to describe it as a conflict of equally
imperative duties, neither of which can yield to the other. For example, in the case
of diverting a river and killing a few to save many more innocent persons, one has
a duty both to abstain from killing the few and to rescue the many. Whatever one
does, one breaches a duty, and the breach appears to be voluntary. It is neither justified nor excused, and yet it seems clearly that a defense ought to be available to the
defendant. This problem came before the German courts in a series of prosecutions
against doctors who had participated in Hitler's euthanasia problem. See Judgment of
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the Queen's Bench took the same stand in Dudley & Stevens; if, as
Lord Coleridge put it,
the broad proposition [advanced is] that a man may save his life by
killing, if necessary, an innocent and unoffending neighbor, it certainly is not law at the present day.3 1
The Kantian argument for this position is that sacrificing an innocent
man for the sake of others is to treat him as a means to an end
and thus to violate the imperative of respecting persons as ends in
themselves . 3
The argument has had considerable impact in Western
thought and helps to account for the common law's hostility to necessity and duress as defenses in homicide cases."

The other type of case unamenable to analysis as justified conduct
is that in which the harm done exceeds or is equal to the gain from
acting. This is the case any time someone kills one or miore persons
to save his own life. The problem is well put in a hypothetical devised by Kadish and Paulsen:
X is unwillingly driving a car along a narrow and precipitous
mountain road, falling off sharply on both sides. .

.

. The head-

lights pick out two persons, apparently and actually drunk, lying
across the road in such a position as to make passage impossible
without running them over. X is prevented from stopping . . .
by suddenly inoperative brakes. His alternatives are either to run
down the drunks or to run off the road and down the mountainside.34
March 5, 1949, 1 Entscheidungen des Obersten Gerichtshof fflr die Britische Zone 321;
Judgment of July 23, 1949, 2 Entscheidungen des Obersten Gerichtshof fir die Britische Zone 117. The doctors' argument was that by remaining in the euthanasia program, they were acting to save lives. They were therefore caught in a conflict of two
duties: (1) to save lives, and (2) to abstain from intentional killing. The court recognized a new defense, which was thought to be extrinsic to the determination of the
defendants' culpability. See Fletcher, Two Kinds of Legal Rules: A Comparative
Study of Burden-of-PersuasionPractices in Criminal Cases, 77 YALE L.J. 880, 921-22
(1967). One tendency in these conflict-of-duty cases is to say the conduct is neither
prohibited nor justified, that the legal order is simply silent on the issue. This seemingly plausible position is, however, rejected by German theorists. H. JEscimc, LnmuBUCH DES SmAmmcaTs 243 (1969); R. MAUlACH, DEuTSCHES STRAsncHT 292 (4th ed.

1971). Yet there is considerable uncertainty in contemporary German theory about
the nature of this defense, which is neither a justification nor an excuse.
31. 14 Q.B.D. at 286.
32. L KANT, GRUNDLEGUNo zUR METAPHYSIX DER STrEN § 2 (1785).
33. In cases excluding homicide from the scope of the defense of duress, the
courts frequently stress the impermissibility of killing an innocent person. See, e.g.,
Watson v. State, 212 Miss. 788, 55 So. 2d 441 (1951); State v. Nargashian, 26 R.I.
299, 58 A. 953 (1904).

34. S. KADISH
1969).

& M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES

544 (2d ed.
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Suppose that the driver runs over and kills the two drunks in order
to save his own life. Could a humane and just legal system do anything but acquit him? Yet his conduct is hardly justified as a maximization of utility: he sacrifices two lives to save one. The problem
is the same any time a man is compelled to protect vital interests by
inflicting greater harm than he stands to suffer. We can think of these
situations as cases of necessity, but the necessity is not a form of justification. It is a form of excuse. It appeals to our sense of compassion
for human weakness in the face of unexpected, overwhelming circumstances.
We have discussed three areas in which the dimensions of necessity diverge. The first is the case of the third party actor who furthers the greater good by intervening to fend off impending harm.
The second is the case of killing to save a greater number of lives.
And the third is the case in which he is compelled to act, but his
act does more harm than good. All three of these situations have
taxed the ingenuity of Western courts and theorists. The major source
of difficulty has been uncertainty about the differing roles of necessity as a defense.
B.

NECEssITy:

CONFLICTING GERMAN AND ANGLO-AMERICAN
APPROACHES

It is useful to contrast the German experience of devising a defense
for all three types of case with the continuing common law confusion
about necessity and its nature. The German Criminal Code of 1871
contained only one sentence on the issue of necessity; in section 54,
the Code provided:
A criminal act is not present whenever, apart from cases of
self-defense, the act is done out of necessity to overcome an imminent risk to the life or bodily security of the actor or one of his
dependents, provided that the actor is not responsible for the
necessity and there is no other way of overcoming it.
Like other sections of the 1871 Code bearing on defensive issues,
this provision does not specify whether the defense functions as a justification or an excuse.35 Yet there are several indications that the underlying rationale of section 54 is that of excusing involuntary conduct.
35.

The standard clause introducing defenses in the 1871 Code is Eine strafbare

Handlung ist nicht vorhanden . . . [a punishable act is not present . .

].

See STGB

§§ 52, 53, 54 (1871). Compare the drafting style of the new Code which distinguishes
clearly in each provision whether the defense is an excuse or a justification. See, e.g.,
SrGB 1975, § 34 (necessity as a justification); id. § 35 (necessity as an excuse).
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First, the provision does not impose a limit on the harm that may be
committed in the name of saving one's own life (or that of a dependent). Thus section 54 would apply to the case, posed above, of the
driver who had to choose between running over two drunks and driving off the road to his own death. Secondly, the provision does not
apply unless the actor's interests are at stake (or those of someone
close to him); this requirement would not attach unless the underlying
rationale were excusing those who succumb to self-interested action.
It was not until the early 1900's that German scholars perceived the
two dimensions of necessity. In a landmark article published in 1913,30
Professor Goldschmidt identified section 54 as a rule pertaining not to the
rightness of the accused's conduct, but to the excusability of his engaging
in wrongful conduct.3 7 Provisions of the Civil Code, on the other hand,
provided for a justification of necessity where the -actor violated the
property interests of another in order to further the greater good. 3
Goldschmidt's analysis brought a semblance of structure to the theory
of necessity, and it also demonstrated a serious gap in the statutory
scheme. The excuse of necessity was limited to cases in which the
actor's or a dependent's serious interest were at stake, and the justification of necessity was limited to cases of inflicting property damage.
Neither theory of the defense covered the case in which a third party
furthers the greater good by violating an interest other than property
rights. Thus there was no basis in the statutory scheme for acquitting
a doctor who aborted a fettis to save the life of the mother. It was
up to the Reichsgericht to round out the statutory scheme. In a dramatic 1927 decision, the German Supreme Court held that implicit
in the criminal law was an extra-statutory justification based on necessity, and that this justification applied to render a life-saving abortion
legal and proper. 9 Since 1927 the German courts have proceeded
on the assumption that the Criminal Code regulates necessity as an
excuse and that the Civil Code, supplemented by the extra-statutory
defense of necessity, governs the justificatory dimension of the issue.
The newly enacted Criminal Code, effective January 1, 1975, provides
separate and comprehensive sections on the two dimensions of neces40
sity.
36. Goldschmidt, Der Notstand, ein Schuldproblem, 1913
ZErrscmuFr FUR STRAnRncffrr 129, 224.

37.

OESTRRIci SCHE

Id. at 134-35.

38. See the discussion of BGB §§ 228 & 904 in note 13 supra.
39. Judgment of Mar. 11, 1927, 61 RGSt. 242.

40. Law of July 4, 1969 (Zweites Gesetz zur Reform des Strafgesetz, § 34-35,
[1969] BGBI. I 717.
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Common law attitudes toward necessity have been much the opposite of those in the German tradition. Whenever the issue of necessity has arisen, the courts have assumed that the only applicable theory
of necessity was that of justification. In the leading case of Dudley
& Stevens, the Queen's Bench assumed that if necessity were to ap4
ply as a defense it would render the homicide lawful and justified. 1
The court had little difficulty concluding that killing an innocent man
was morally wrong and therefore unjustifiable. 42 Thus the judges excluded necessity as a possible defense. What eluded the Queen's
Bench in 1884 was that a killing might be unlawful, unjustified and
murderous, but nonetheless be excused under the unique circumstances of the case.43 This was a manner of legal thinking that perturbed the judges. It symbolized "a divorce of law from, morality
which would be of fatal consequence.

'44

The court assumed that if the defendants were to be acquitted,
it would have to be under a rule clarifying the elements of murder-a
rule that would be applicable in future cases as well. 45 The only such
rule the court could imagine was the repugnant proposition "that a
man may save his life by killing, if necessary, an innocent and unoffending neighbor.

4' 6

The Queen's Bench had no difficulty making another type of
decision without relying on rules. It intimated that although it favored
conviction, it would welcome the Queen's clemency. 47

Indeed the

41. The Queen's Bench did not even discuss the possibility of excusing, as opposed to justifying the homicide. It identified the issue of yielding to pressure with
"temptation to murder" (14 Q.B.D. at 287) and held that "temptation" could not be
"an excuse for crime." Id. at 288.
42. Id. at 286.
43. A more charitable reading of the opinion is that the court regarded any
chosen form of conduct, however limited the options of choice, as fully voluntary and
therefore unexcused. See the discussion of the perspectives on voluntariness in note
27 supra. This view of the concept of involuntariness correlates with the earlier rejection of the "irresistible impulse" test as a criterion of legal insanity. Regina v. Burton, 176 Eng. Rep. 354, 357 (1863) (irresistible impulse called a "most dangerous doctrine"). The M'Naghten test of insanity, like the holding in Dudley & Stevens, implicitly endorses the view that any choice at all is morally equivalent to a responsible
choice.
44. 14 Q.B.D. at 287. It is not clear what the "fatal consequence" would be;
presumably the public would confuse the acquittal with approbation, and thus others
would be encouraged to kill and cannibalize innocent persons.
45. The court defines the "real question in the case" to be whether the killing
"be or be not murder." Id. at 281.
46. Id. at 286.
47. Id. at 288.
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Crown subsequently did commute the death sentences to six months'
imprisonment.4"

The decision to solicit executive clemency was much

like a decision to excuse a case of unjustified killing. 49 It was based
on an individualized assessment of the facts and of the character and

propensities of the defendants. But it was not the kind of decision
the Queen's Bench could call part of the "law"; therefore, the court
regarded the decision to excuse the killing as beyond its province.

Common law jurists now regard Dudley & Stevens with uneasiThere is something inescapably odd about a court's simultaneously affirming a conviction and recommending clemency.
The
Model Penal Code sought to correct the mistake in the Dudley &
Stevens syllogism, but it did so by tampering with the wrong premise.
Necessity should be a justification, the draftsmen concluded in section
3.02, any time an actor favors the greater good;5 1 this principle, the
ness.5"

48. As noted by the reporter "A.P.S." Id.
49. Yet it is important to note, as the court concedes, id. at 288, that clemency
is an expression of mercy; excusing, in contrast, is an expression of compassion. There
are significant differences between the two sentiments. First, mercy is always expressed by a superior to an inferior, and only when the superior person has the power
and the right to subject the inferior to significant loss. Compassion, in contrast, is
always expressed among persons on an equal plane; it is not the forfeiture of a right
or power, but the recognition that there is no basis in the facts for claiming a right
or power over the object of compassion. Secondly, mercy is expressed freely, on the
basis of an assessment of the recipient's entire moral worth. Compassion is expressed
in a particular factual setting, and need not encompass an analysis of the recipient's
general moral worth. To grasp the difference between mercy and compassion in the
context of Dudley & Stevens, consider whether the Queen would have commuted the
sentence if the two defendants were known to be rogues or dedicated revolutionaries.
Could one, either morally or predictively, expect the Queen to commute their sentence?
Presumably not. On the other hand, if the issue were compassion for their conduct
under the extreme circumstances of the case, questions about their record for loyalty
and honesty would presumably be irrelevant. For a critique of the English tendency
to rely upon the executive prerogative of mercy to correct abuses of the courts,
particularly in cases of capital punishment, see Devlin, Criminal Responsibility and
Punishment: Functions of Judge and Jury, 54 CRIM. L. REV. 661, 664-66 (1954).
50. G. WILLIAMS, CRIMnNL LAw: THn GENERAL PART 741-45 (2d ed. 1961);
Glazebrook, The Necessity Plea in English Criminal Law, 30 CAMB. L.J. 87, 112-17
(1972); MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02, Comment at 9-10 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958)
[hereinafter cited as Comment].
51. One curious feature of MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 is that the defense is not
limited by the requirement that the risk represent a "direct and immediate peril." See
United States v. Kroncke, 459 F.2d 697, 700-01 (8th Cir. 1972); accord, Judgment of
July 12, 1951, 1951 NEUE JURusrIscHE WocHENscmuFT 769 (Bundesgerichtshof, Germany). The only limitations on the defense are that there be (1) no more specifically
defined defense covering the case, and (2) no legislative purpose to exclude the defense.
It is not surprising that the provision has not been adopted in this form in the
states that have reformed their penal codes in line with the Model Penal Code. See
N.Y. PENAL LAWS § 35.05 (McKinney 1967); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.47 (1958).
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draftsmen point out in commentary, would permit a court to conclude
"on utilitarian grounds" 52 that killing one man to save three was justifiable. By extending the principle of necessity as a justification to
homicidal conduct, the draftsmen thought they had corrected the error
of Dudley & Stevens and had fashioned a comprehensive rule of neces5
sity. 3

It will be remembered, however, that there are two areas in
which necessity might have to function as an excuse in order to generate just and humane results.

The first is the area of homicidal be-

havior, and the second is the area in which the actor saves his own
life at a cost greater than or equal to one human life. The Model
Penal Code disposes of the first by assimilating it, without qualm, to

cases of conduct justified under a utilitarian calculus. The Code cannot so easily distend theories of justification to accommodate the sec-

ond type of case: killing two men to avoid driving alone off the road
is not supportable under any theory of justification.

4

The remarkable

fact about the Model Penal Code is that it provides no solution at
all to the second type of case. It is hard to believe, but the draftsmen

ignored the problem.

This was the tariff for maintaining that neces-

sity was exclusively a justificatory rationale.
52. Comment, supra note 50, at 10.
53. Embracing a utilitarian rationale for justifying homicide induces concern for
procedural fairness in selecting the victim. Id. Yet it has never been clear to me
why, on utilitarian grounds, the procedure should matter. If it is right for three of
the starving sailors in Dudley & Stevens to kill the fourth in order to survive, why
should it matter which three of the four take the initiative? The emphasis on procedures, such as drawing lots, see United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360 (No. 15,383)
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842), would seem to speak to values other than the optimization of
utility. As in the book of Jonah, the throwing of lots suggests that a higher power
(God, fate) is responsible for selecting the victim. The procedure thus serves to deflect responsibility from the men who are the true agents of the killing. See Jonah
1:7 (lots thrown to determine whose presence was the occasion for God's causing the
storm); the instruction of Judge Baldwin to the jury in Holmes, 26 F. Cas. at 36668 ("When the selection has been made by lots, the victim yields of course to his fate
54. Charles Fried once argued, interestingly, that the killing of the two drunks
could be justified on a theory akin to self-defense. One would have to picture the
driving on the highway as the normal state of affairs; the two drunks, lying in the
roadway, might then appear as aggressors against the driver. Some views of self-defense permit the causing of unlimited harm in the interest of protecting the defender's
autonomy. See Psychotic Aggressor, supra note 21, at 378-80 (discussing Self-Defense
H). The argument is interesting, for it illustrates how much turns on picturing the
running over the two drunks as defensive or passive conduct as opposed to assertive
killing. For a similar effort to generate an image of abortion as defensive conduct, see
Thompson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PImL. & Pun. AFFAms 47 (1971).
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The common law theory of necessity has hardly matured since
the decision in Dudley & Stevens. Witness a routine case decided
three years ago by -the Supreme Court of Missouri. 5 A convict named
Green suffered a series of homosexual rapes and attacks by fellow
convicts. He sought help from the prison guards; they ignored his
pleas. On the day of his alleged offense, four other convicts told him
they would rape him that evening. "Snitching" in the prison meant
that he was likely to be killed. There was no available protective
confinement other than the disciplinary "hole." As you or I would
have done under the circumstances, Green went over the wall. Upon
being caught, he was charged with escaping from a state institution,
convicted, and sentenced to an additional three-year term. The Supreme Court ruled that the trial judge properly kept all the data on
the prior and threatened homosexual rapes from the jury. Green's
peers were not even allowed to consider whether compassion for his
situation required an acquittal.
In the Green case, as in Dudley & Stevens, the court assumed
that there was only one dimension to necessity: the dimension of balancing interests.5 6 The Missouri Supreme Court could have held the
evidence of prior and threatened homosexual rapes admissible on the
ground that it might have been right, on balance, for Green to break
out of prison. The defense of lesser evils could well have pointed
toward acquittal, yet there are several reasons why a contemporary
Anglo-American court would be reluctant to label Green's conduct as
right and proper. For one, it would be fashioning a rule that would
seem to give other similarly maltreated inmates the right to walk out
the front door. Further, judges today are likely to interweave two
distinct questions of balancing: first, whether on balance the defendant did the right thing, and secondly, whether it would be right, on
balance, to acquit the defendant. Looking at Green's conduct as
a matter of interest-balancing readily blends with the court's balancing
the benefits and burdens of deciding to acquit. 57 Once the court starts
55.

State v. Green, 470 S.W.2d 565 (Mo. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1073

(1972).
56. The majority defined the defendant's claim to be that "the conditions of his
confinement justified his escape." Id. at 568. Further, it defined the relevant defense
of justification to require a determination that the conduct optimized utility. Id. In
contrast, Judge Seiler, dissenting, stressed the analogy between coercion or duress as
a defense and the necessity of Green's escape. The issue for the dissent is not whether
Green chose the greater good, but whether his conduct was blameless. Id. at 570.
57. In discussing the defense of lesser evils as applied to prison escapes in People
v. Richards, 269 Cal. App. 2d 768, 75 Cal. Rptr. 597 (1969), the court said that part
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focusing on the interests weighing against acquittal, Green's chances
plummet.58

He would have been far better off if he could have an-

chored the debate to the limited inquiry whether his escape was excused by the impending rapes. 59 He might then have kept the court's
focus on the question of whether he could fairly be blamed for yieldof the harm the defendant would have to weigh in the balance would be "the destruction of the general discipline of the prison." Id. at 778, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 604. If
an escape should cause a breakdown in prison discipline, there would obviously be at
least two contributing factors: (1) the escape itself, and (2) the subsequent acquittal
on the ground of lesser evils. The paradox of interweaving the justification of escape
with the justification of the acquittal is that if the defendant is convicted of escape,
his escape appears to be relatively more justifiable. That is, the conviction reduces
the likelihood that his escape would cause a breakdown of discipline and thus diminishes the costs of the escape. This paradox derives from the fallacy of assessing the
costs of the escape as though the defendant were acquitted in his subsequent trial; because those costs appear to be high (even though they are purely hypothetical) they
are relied upon to justify the conviction. The paradox can be avoided only by distinguishing rigorously between justifying the escape and justifying the acquittal; the acquittal should be justified if the escape furthered the greater good under the circumstances.
The costs of the acquittal cannot be considered part of the "circumstances" without
sliding back into the paradox we are trying to avoid.
58. The record of appellate decisions hardly gives one cause to believe that balancing interests might lead to an acquittal or a reversal. Dempsey v. United States,
283 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1960) (defense rejected on behalf of escapee who was a diabetic and claimed that he escaped to get a needed shot of insulin); People v. Richards,
269 Cal. App. 2d 768, 75 Cal. Rptr. 597 (1969) (defendant contended that he escaped
to avoid rape; defense rejected); People v. Whipple, 100 Cal. App. 261, 279 P. 1008
(1929) (defendant sought to defend his escape on the ground that prison conditions
were intolerable; defense rejected); State v. Palmer, 45 Del. 308, 72 A.2d 442 (Ct. Gen.
Sess. 1950) (defense of necessity rejected in escape case, the court stressing "[slound reasons of public policy," id. at 310, 72 A.2d at 444); State v. Cahill, 196 Iowa 486,
194 N.W. 191 (1923) (defense of necessity rejected in case of escape from allegedly
intolerable solitary confinement); Hinkle v. Commonwealth, 23 Ky. L. Rptr. 1988, 66
S.W. 816 (1902) (possibility of defense rejected even though defendant argued that
he escaped for fear of being shot); People v. Noble, 18 Mich. App. 300, 170 N.W.2d
916 (1969) (defense rejected on facts comparable to Green; the court feared a "rash
of escapes, all rationalized by unverifiable tales of sexual assault," id. at 303, 170 N.W.
2d at 918); State v. Davis, 14 Nev. 439 (1880) (possibility of justifying escape from
allegedly intolerable conditions rejected); People v. Brown, 70 Misc. 2d 224, 333 N.Y.S.
2d 342 (1972) (defense of lesser evils held inapplicable to case in which convicts held
guards as hostages in order to protest prison conditions).
59. There is some evidence that focusing on the issue of compulsion rather than
lesser evils aids the defendant. Note the acquittal of defendants Terry and Cooper
in the case of People v. Cooper, No. 38602 (Sacramento County Super. Ct., Aug. 11,
1971), discussed in Note, Duress and the Prison Escape: A New Use for an Old Defense, 45 S. CAL.. L. Rv. 1062 (1972). According to the latter report, defense counsel argued at trial that because the inmates feared for their lives, the case should be
treated as one of duress under CAL. PENAL CODE § 26(8) (West 1970). 45 S. CAL.
L. REv. at 1062-63. See also State v. Green, 470 S.W.2d 565, 568 (Mo. 1971) (Seiler,
J., dissenting) (arguing that the theory of duress should encompass prison escapes
where the defendant's conduct is blameless).
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ing to the pressure of the situation. By so directing the inquiry, he
might have been able to divert judicial attention away from the prospective benefits and burdens of their decision and toward the requirements implicit in treating the individual defendant fairly. Yet at
least for the last century, judges in England and the United States
have been unreceptive to that mode of decision. The unequivocal
preference is for a future-oriented assessment of the virtues of deciding for and against the defendant; there is little commitment to the
imperative of treating the defendant justly-as a value independent
of the resulting social benefits. As a result, a lawyer in a case like
Green is hard-pressed to induce the court to focus on the question
whether the defendant can be fairly blamed for yielding to overwhelming pressure, for that question is not tied directly to any social goal
that would outweigh the benefits arrayed in favor of conviction.
Like the draftsmen of the Model Penal Code, American judges are
prone to insist that the only relevant dimension of necessity is the
defense of lesser evils; thus the theoretical rationale for acquittal is
whether, on balance, the defendant acted in the social interest. Yet that
dimension rarely yields acquittals.6 0 And whenever a strong interestlike maintaining discipline in the prisons-emerges on the opposing scale,
the judges are likely to frustrate the defendant's appeal to the greater
good. 61
60. The textwriters maintain that necessity is a defense recognized in the AngloAmerican legal tradition. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02, Comment at 6 (Tent. Draft
No. 8, 1958); W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, CRIMINAL LAW 382 (1972); G. WILLIAMS,
CRiMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 724 (2d ed. 1961). But one is hard pressed to
find criminal cases where a court actually reverses for mistake by the trial judge
in instructing or excluding evidence on the issue of necessity. There are some
cases in which a court appeals to a constitutional or a natural right in order to
justify the kind of result that would be obtained under a defense of necessity
or lesser evils. E.g., State v. Jackson, 71 N.H. 552, 53 A. 1021 (1902) (natural
right to protect one's children and thus to keep them out of school when ill); Cross
v. State, 370 P.2d 371 (Wyo. 1962) (constitutional right to protect property from marauding moose). In another situation, the court relied upon a theory of contract interpretation to justify a seamen's strike at sea, United States v. Ashton, 24 F. Cas. 873
(No. 14,470) (C.C.D. Mass. 1834) (the seamen "contract only to do their duty and
meet ordinary perils and to obey reasonable orders." Id. at 874; followed in United
States v. Nye, 27 F. Cas. 210 (No. 15,906) (C.C.D. Mass. 1855). These cases may
represent the particularized, furctional equivalent of the justification of necessity; but
it would be a mistake to say they recognize the defense as such. When common law
courts discuss the defense of necessity, it is typically by way of holding the defense
inapplicable. E.g., United States v. Kroncke, 459 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1972); cf. People
v. Brown, 70 Misc. 2d 224, 333 N.Y.S.2d 342 (1972) (N.Y. PENAL LAWS § 35.05 (McKinney 1967) held to be applicable only to "technically criminal behavior that no one
would consider improper.")
61. See cases cited note 58 supra.
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Thus one sees the extent to which the common law approach
to necessity diverges radically from the German historical development. Anglo-American jurists are now inclined to hold that the defense of lesser evils ought, in principle, to justify violations of the law,
yet the system remains averse both to applying this defense in practice
and to recognizing a general excuse based on human frailty in situations of extraordinary pressure. The German pattern, in contrast, is
rooted in the theory of necessity as an excuse; the defense of lesser
evils emerges later as a way of covering those cases in which the actor's own interests are not at stake. This divergence manifests a
deeper jurisprudential rift, which runs to the core of each system's
conception of the law and appropriate judicial roles. The common
law pattern reflects the influence of 19th century positivism blended
with a commitment to decide each case instrumentally-a commitment
to justify each decision as a means of optimizing the community's welfare. We shall return in conclusion to this account of the common
law's posture toward necessity; but first we should broaden the analysis
by turning to a comparative survey of duress, insanity and mistake
of law.

C. DURESS: NECESSITY REVISITED
If common law judges have failed to acknowledge the excusing dimension of necessity, they have not fared so poorly in the field of duress.
Jury instructions on duress frequently build on words like "coercion,"
"compulsion," and "involuntariness." 62 There is at least some recognition that the issue posed by a claim of duress is not whether the
act was justified, but whether the actor's will was overborne by circumstances.0 3 Stressing the issue of involuntariness makes it clear
that the law's dominant concern is not the act in the abstract, but the
extent to which the act reveals the kind of person the actor is.
Yet there are also contrary indications in the common law of duress. There are some signs that courts and legislators are inclined to
recognize duress as a defense only when they feel that the act is right
and justified. First, duress is frequently recognized as a defense only
62. D'Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338 (9th Cir. 1951); Shannon v. United
States, 76 F.2d 490 (10th Cir. 1935); State v. St. Clair, 262 S.W.2d 25 (Mo. 1953);
Regina v. Hudson, [1971] 2 W.L.R. 1047, [1971] 2 All E.R. 244 (Ct. of Appeal,
Crim. Div.); Rex v. Crutchley, 172 Eng. Rep. 909 (1831).
63. See generally Neiman & Weizer, Duress, Free Will and the Criminal Law,
30 S. CAL. L. REv. 313 (1957).
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when the actor's life is in danger; 64 and secondly, it is rarely and only
recently admitted as a defense in cases of homicide.6 5 These two requirements, taken together, mean that the defense of duress is available only to those who protect an interest (namely life) that is greater
than the harm caused (which must be less than the taking of life).
These restrictions on the common law defense of duress belie
efforts to label the issue as an excusing condition. If the issue were
exclusively the involuntariness of the deed-and not its rectitudethere would be no reason to reject claims of duress in homicide cases.
German law recognizes the applicability of duress in homicide as well
as other cases,6 6 and so it must if it distinguishes rigorously between
the issues of justifying a deed and excusing it. Yet the common law
is obviously ambivalent about the distinction. It uses the idiom of
excuses in characterizing duress, but it insists that the party relying
on duress act to further the greater good.
The Model Penal Code has fashioned a defense of duress free
of some of the inconsistencies of the common law tradition. It is classified as an "excuse," it requires merely a threat of unlawful force
against the person, and it is available as a defense to every crime, including homicide.6 7 Yet the Model Penal Code also betrays the common law's reluctance to inquire straightforwardly into the connection
between an improper act and the actor's character. Section 2.09 of
the Code provides:
It is an affirmative defense that the actor engaged in the conduct
charged to constitute an offense because he was coerced to do so by
64.
(1964).
65.
v. State,
(1930);

E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE

§ 26(8) (West 1970);

MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.08

A long line of cases rejects the applicability of duress in homicide cases: Arp
97 Ala. 5, 12 So. 301 (1893); Taylor v. State, 158 Miss. 505, 130 So. 502
State v. Nargashian, 26 R.I. 299, 58 A. 953 (1904). See also 1 E. EAST,
PLEAS OF THE CROWN 225 (1806); 4 W. BLACKSONE, COMMENTAmES *30. But cf.
Jones v. State, 207 Ga. 379, 62 S.E.2d 187 (1950) (homicide conviction reversed, duress recognized as a defense). In 1968, the Georgia legislature intervened to bring
Georgia law back in line with the dominant common law position. See GA. CODE
ANN. § 26-906 (1972) (expressly exempting murder from the scope of coercion as a
defense).
66. Judgment of Jan. 14, 1964, 1964 NEnu JulnsTisc-m WocHENscRimFr 730
(Bundesgerichtshof, Germany) (recognizing the applicability of necessity and duress as
defenses in prosecutions arising out of the mass murder of Jews in White Russia in
1941). It is noteworthy that both the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of
Germany have abolished or are in the process of abolishing duress as a separate
defense. The Soviet Union has assimilated it to necessity as a justification R.S.F.S.R.
1960 UGOL. KOD. [CRtM. CODE] § 14; see discussion note 3 supra; the West Germans
have assimilated it to necessity as an excuse, STGB 1975, § 35; see note 2 supra.
67. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09, Comment at 8 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).
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the use of, or threat to use, unlawful force against his person or the
person of another, which a person of reasonable firmness in his
situation would have been unable to resist.
"Reasonable men" and "persons of reasonable firmness" are
ubiquitous in the language of the common law, and yet the same rhetorical figures are strangers to German legal idiom. This is not a fortuitous difference between the two systems. There is a close connection between each system's orientation toward excusing conditions
and its reliance on fictitious standards like that of the reasonable man.
The common law's aversion to excusing conditions is coupled with the
felt indispensability of the reasonable man standard; the German law's
cultivating excusing conditions is tied to indifference toward fictitious
standards of exemplary men. 8 This correlation is not at all mysterious, for the standard of the reasonable person provides a substitute for
inquiries about the actor's character and culpability. This means that
a system willing to assess character and culpability has no need of
reasonable men; and a system afraid to look squarely at the character
and culpability of the defendant must do so indirectly, by relying on
standards like "the person of reasonable firmness." Let us see exactly
why this is so.
What is the operative significance of the phrase "person of reasonable firmness" in section 2.09? The point of the requirement is
that not every case of alleged duress is sufficient to excuse the defendant. Suppose someone kills another in order to avoid a slap in
the face. Or suppose a government employee discloses official secrets
to avoid having his car stolen. These are cases in which we would
not be inclined to recognize the defense. It may well be true that
these two actors felt "compelled" or "coerced" to act, but their sense
of being compelled is hardly enough to warrant excusing their conduct.
There are two equivalent ways of explaining this result. The
first approach would be to ask: Are these actors culpable for not resisting the threats? The first step in resolving that issue is to account
for the actors' feeling compelled to act as they did. Unless we have
68. It is not that German scholars would never refer to standards like the "average man." See, e.g., H. JESCHECic, LEHRBUCH DES STRAFREClrs 333 (1969) (discussing the standard of the Durchschnitsmenschen in connection with the theory of
extrastatutory excusing conditions). But these standards do not appear in German legislation and they play an insignificant part in German criminal theory. As a general
matter, there is no term in German theory whose function replicates the ubiquitous
use of "reasonableness" in the common law. There are very deep reasons for this difference in terminology, but that is a subject for a separate paper.
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additional facts about the psychological make-up of these defendants,
we may suppose that the first actor was simply afraid of being slapped
in the face. The second was presumably selfish; he was simply unwilling to make a personal sacrifice for the sake of governmental secrets. Do the traits of cowardice and selfishness excuse criminal behavior? Hardly. In the typical case, we can fairly expect of a
man that he conquer his cowardice in the interest of saving human
lives, or of a government official that he overcome his selfishness when
governmental secrets are at stake.6 9 Of course, if the conduct of either was indeed beyond his control, 70 it would be appropriate to excuse the conduct. But it would take some discernible pathology to
cause us to believe that either of these men could not have done otherwise. Thus, according to this first approach, we relate the act to the
actor's character traits and then assess whether the actor should be
expected to control his propensities to act in the particular way.
The second path to the same result is the conventional common
law formula: Would a reasonable person under the circumstances have
acted in the same way? This test seems deceptively simple, yet
its application requires the same logical steps and the same moral judgments as the first approach discussed above. Is the reasonable person
cowardly? Is he selfish? If he were, our two allegedly coerced actors
would have good defenses. Common law courts would obviously hold
that the reasonable man is neither cowardly nor selfish. Why? Because these are traits that men can be fairly expected to surmount
to save the life of another or to protect other vital interests. Thus,
the definition of the reasonable person requires the same analysis and
moral sensitivity as the frontal assessment of the actor's character and

culpability.

71

69. There is little sensitivity today to this kind of reasoning in Anglo-American
cases. But cf. Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212 (1862), in which the court reasoned
that the standard for the defense of provocation should include the defendant's "peculiar weakness of mind or infirmity of temper, not arising from wickedness of heart or
cruelty of disposition." Id. at 221. That is, the test for whether the defendant was
to blame for yielding to a particular disposition was whether that disposition or trait
manifested a "wickedness of heart."
70. The term "control" is ambiguous in precisely the same way as the terms
"voluntary," "choice," and "compulsion." "Control" might refer to that degree of selfautomation necessary to say that the accused has acted as an independent agent; or
it might refer to that degree of self-control necessary to say that the accused is fairly
accountable for his conduct. Cf. the parallel analysis of the concept of "voluntariness"
in note 27 supra.
71. This analysis is hardly shared by the courts and commentators. In Bedder
v. Director of Pub. Prosecutions, [1954] 1 W.L.R. 1119 (H.L.), the House of Lords
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To demonstrate this point more satisfactorily, let us suppose that
our first hypothetical defendant kills to avoid being struck in the groin,

and that it can be shown by reliable medical evidence that he has
a pathological fear of castration and genital injury. The case for ex-

cusing him now seems more convincing; for we can now attribute his
conduct to a personality disposition beyond his control. Would it also
seem more convincing under the standard of the "person of reasonable
firmness"? It all depends, does it not, on the characteristics attributed
to this fictitious character? If the applicable standard is the reasonable

man with a pathological fear of castration, the jury might well acquit
the defendant; if the applicable standard is the reasonable man without

such fears, the jury would probably convict.

How, then, does one

decide how to instruct the jury?
There is only one sound way to determine the traits attributed
to the reasonable man, and that is with an eye to the justice of blaming
the accused for having displayed weakness of character. If we keep
from the jury an important fact bearing on the homicide, namely the
accused's pathological fears, we distort the jury's attempt to assess the
causes of the killing. We skew the jury's inquiry toward finding that
it was a culpable weakness of will, rather than uncontrollable pathological factors that induced the killing. For the defendant to be treated
justly, the jury instructions should refer to a standard of a reasonable
man with the specific pathological fears of the defendant. There is
no doubt that the reasonable man standard can be adjusted and manipheld that the defendant's impotency was irrelevant in defining the standard of the "reasonable person" to be applied in assessing the alleged provocation by a prostitute. The
court could see no difference between "an unusually excitable or pugnacious temperament" and the defendant's impotence. id. at 1123. If it particularized the standard
by including the latter, presumably it would also have to include the former. Commentators criticized the decision, but hardly advanced our understanding of the connection
between (1) the analysis of culpability and (2) the traits to be attributed to the reasonable man. Edwards, Provocation and the Reasonable Man, Another View, 1954
Cnim. L. REv. 898, 905 (1954); Note, Manslaughter and the Adequacy of Provocation:
The Reasonablenessof the Reasonable Man, 106 U. PA. L. Rv. 1021 (1958); 70 L.Q.
REv. 442, 443 (1954). Nonetheless, there is a widespread sense that Redder is wrong.
In the context of provocation as a partial defense, the Model Penal Code responds to
this sense by shifting the seemingly indispensable concept of reasonableness from its
place in defining an exemplary actor to asking whether there is a "reasonable explanation or excuse" for the "extreme mental or emotional disturbance" inducing the homicide. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Also note
the perspicacity of the comments to this provision. MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.3, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). For another effort at individualizing the defense of
provocation, see NEw ZEALAND CRIMES Acr § 169 (1969). The intriguing implication
is that where the issue is mitigation, rather than excuse, the common law courts are prepared to move to a relatively more individualized standard.
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ulated to encourage the right kind of jury deliberations. But the only
way to make these adjustments in the standards is to decide by the
first method discussed above whether the personality disposition accounting for the act is one that the accused should be able to control.
If the accused should be able to overcome his dispositions, as in the
case of cowardice and selfishness, these dispositions should not be attributed to the reasonable man; if the accused could not control the
relevant disposition, as in the case of documentable, pathological fears,
the disposition must be included in the standard used to assess the
defendant's conduct.7 2
There is no suggestion in this analysis that the reasonable man
test need yield results different from those obtained by assessing the
actor's character and culpability. 73 Indeed, the appeal of the reasonable man is precisely that he permits one, covertly, to make the same
judgment that one would make in openly discussing the defendant's
moral responsibility for his conduct. Yet if that is the case, one wonders why common law judges bother with the circumvention; why not
simply ask whether the accused ought to have been able to resist the
pressure exerted on him? This is a problem -to which I shall return
in conclusion. As we shall see, it is part of the broader puzzle posed
by the common law's distinctive anxiety about decisions not based on
rules.

D. INsAmTY
Insanity is probably the clearest case of an excusing condition in the
common law tradition. The courts have never confused insanity with
the criteria of justification. It would be absurd to suggest that a man's
psychological incapacity renders his conduct right and proper. Thus,
at least in the case of insanity, common law jurists admit the possibil72. In fact, however, common law courts are disinclined to consider the defendant's psychiatric condition in assessing the defenses of duress and necessity. People
v. Goldman, 245 Cal. App. 2d 376, 53 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1966) (defendant's "psychiatric
assertions" irrelevant in considering whether prison escape was excused); Ross v. State,
169 Ind. 388, 82 N.E. 781 (1907) (court rejected defendant's mental disability in analyzing defense of duress). But cf. State v. St. Clair, 262 S.W.2d 25 (Mo. 1953) (conviction reversed for failure to instruct adequately on the issue of duress; the court suggests that it would be relevant in assessing the defense that the defendant suffered food
poisoning as a child and was "mentally impaired.").
73. And yet the use of the "reasonable man" test does in fact affect the outcome
of litigation when the issue is duress or provocation. See notes 71-72 supra. Compare
the problem whether an "objective" standard of negligence produces results different
from a "subjective" standard of negligence.

at 406 & n.21.

See Criminal Negligence, supra note 11,
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ity that an act might be wrongful and unjustified,
actor is not to blame for committing it.

4

even though the

Among some common law writers and legislators, however, the
defense of insanity has suffered another kind of distortion. There is
a tendency in some quarters to think of the criminal law as applicable
only to normal adults. 5 On this view of criminal responsibility, insanity and infancy become preliminary questions that one must resolve
before deciding whether the criminal law is applicable. The California Penal Code provides, for example, that:
All persons are capable of committing crimes except those
belonging to the following classes:
One-Children under the age of fourteen ....
Two-Idiots.

Three-Lunatics and insane persons.

....

7.

As this provision is drafted, insanity is a status, not a condition
explaining and excusing a particular act. This provision dates to
1872, but the view is even more fashionable today. Commentators
now realize that a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity leads,
operationally, to one form of commitment rather than another. This
fact of life has led to considerable skepticism whether insanity functions as an excuse. As Herbert Packer argues in his thoughtful book,
The Limits of the CriminalSanction:
The insanity defense cannot be viewed as an excuse in the
ordinary sense. It would be more useful to say that its successful
invocation is a direction to punish but not to punish criminally
The insanity defense has no more to do with mens rea than
does the defense of infancy. .... 77
74. This concession is implicit in the test of insanity under MODEL PENAL CODa
§ 4.01(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962), which provides in part that the actor is
not responsible if "he lacks substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct." The draftsmen left open the choice between the terms "criminality" and "wrongfulness." In United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir.
1972), the District of Columbia adopted this test and opted for the word "wrongfulness." Id. at 971. If the insane actor does not appreciate the wrongfulness of his
act, it follows that his act is regarded, objectively, as wrongful.
75. See, e.g., J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 436 n.85 (2d ed.
1960) ("lAin insane person is not bound by duties of the penal law.")
76. CAL. PENAL CODE § 26 (West 1970).
77. H. PACKER, THE LiMITs OF THE CRIMNAL SANCTION 134 (1968).
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It con-

fuses an empirical concomitant of civil commitment with the grounds
and justification for that commitment.

Let us suppose that men ac-

quitted by reason of insanity are regularly and routinely committed.
It certainly does not follow that the verdict of not guilty is a "direction

to punish" by civil commitment.

The rationale for the commitment

is a prediction of future dangerousness, not the finding that the actor
was insane at the time of the act charged. 78 Now most courts may

suppose that men acquitted by reason of insanity are sufficiently dangerous to be committed.

But that practice may be wrong; it may in7

9

deed be unconstitutional.
That courts rely on one index of dangerousness at one point in history hardly warrants the claim that the insanity defense does not perform an excusing function. Yet one is invar-

iably struck by the widespread willingness of common law writers to
reject the excusing function of the insanity defense.

This willingness

may well be further testimony to the deeply rooted hostility of the
common law to the excusing conditions of the criminal law.

E.

0

MISTAKE OF LAW

Mistakes about the legality of conduct impose the hardest strain on

a legal system's sensitivity to individual justice. It is so easy for courts
and commentators to slip into the mindless rhetoric about everyone's

being presumed to know the law. Common law courts regularly intone that liturgy,81 as German courts did about a hundred years ago.82
In this century, German theorists have been engaged in intense debate

about the appropriate doctrinal analysis of mistakes of law and about
the kind of defense the courts should administer.

This theoretical

work has led the courts through several stages of development-stages
78. A. GOLDSTErN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 161-67 (1967); Goldstein & Katz,
Abolish the "Insanity Delense"-Why Not?, 72 YALE L.J. 853, 866-69 (1963).
79. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967) (holding that a supplementary
hearing is required for commitment under Colorado Sex Offenders Act); Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (holding that there is no constitutionally acceptable
distinction between ordinary civil commitment and commitment after acquittal by reason of insanity).
80. This tendency in common law thinking runs parallel to Soviet legal theory,
according to which the issue of insanity is classified as an issue bearing on the status
of the offender, rather than the way the criminal act was committed. Kuos, supra
note 17, at 205-56 (treating insanity and infancy as the issues bearing on the "Subject
of the Crime").
81. E.g., Satterfield v. State, 172 Neb. 275, 280, 109 N.W.2d 415, 418 (1961);
State v. Woods, 107 Vt. 354, 356-57, 179 A. 1, 2 (1935).
82. Judgment of Sept. 25, 1880, 2 RGSt. 268.
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that are regrettably too complicated to document here."3 After a landmark decision in 1952, s" the German courts and theorists have con-

verged on a fairly simple formula; translated into English legal idiom,
the German rule is that reasonable mistakes of law excuse; unreason-

able mistakes do not.8 5 Whether a mistake is reasonable depends on
whether the actor could be fairly and justly expected to perceive the
6
wrongfulness of his conduct.8

For good or ill, the common law is at about the stage of sophistication commanded by German theorists at the turn of the century. 7
83. A tentative analysis of the development would include the following stages
and styles of analysis:
1) Treating the issue of illegality (Rechtswidrigkeit) as an element of the offense and therefore classifying mistakes of law as mistakes denying elements of
the offense. See Judgment of Mar. 26, 1889, 19 RGSt. 209. This style corresponds to the technique in People v. Weiss, 276 N.Y. 384, 12 N.E.2d 514 (1938),
discussed in the text at notes 88-91 infra. Its application depended on the code's
referring explicitly to Rechtswidrigkeit as an element of the offense.
2) Distinguishing between mistakes about the criminal law and mistakes extrinsic
to the criminal law. See Judgment of Nov. 8, 1901, 34 RGSt. 418 (issue was
whether in an incest prosecution, it was a mistake of criminal law or private law
to assume, incorrectly, that a divorce from a former wife terminated the legal relationship with one's former stepdaughter).
3) Treating all mistakes of law, whether reasonable or not, as denying the intent
required for conviction. This was endorsed in Judgment of Apr. 13, 1946,
DEUTSCHE R cfTs-ZErrscHuar 126 (Oberlandesgericht Kiel).
The first stage proved to be unsatisfactory, for it was too closely tied to legislated language; the second stage, because the distinction between the two types of mistake eventually appeared to be arbitrary; and the third stage, because it awarded a defense even
in cases where the mistake of law was negligent (if the crime was not punishable when
committed negligently). See generally H. JrscHmcK, LEHMUCH DES STmAnncHTs 294306 (1969); Ryu & Silving, Error Juris: A Comparative Study, 24 U. CH. L. lEV.
421 (1957); Criminal Negligence, supra note 11, at 420-23. For the position that finally emerged in German law, see text accompanying notes 84-86 infra.
84. Judgment of Mar. 18, 1952, 2 BGHSt. 194.
85. The test as formulated by the German Supreme Court is whether the mistake
is unavoidable (unliberwindlich). Id. at 209. If it is, it provides a complete defense.
If it is avoidable (liberwindlich), it functions merely to mitigate guilt. This is the
position called the Schuldtheorie in the German literature and endorsed by many leading scholars. See, e.g., H. WELzEL, DAs DEUtSCHE STRAFRECHT 164-74 (11th ed.
1969) (as formulated herein, however, the distinction is between mistakes that are vermeidbar and those that are unvermeidbar); R. MAuRACH, DErscHEs STAFREcrrr 47184 (4th ed. 1971) (concurring in terminology). Cf. STGB 1975, § 17 (unavoidable
mistake of law (Verbotsirrtum) precludes culpability and liability).
86. More specifically, in its Judgment of Jan. 27, 1966, 20 BGHSt. 18, the German Supreme Court defined a mistake to be unavoidable (unliberwindlich) when
the actor, in light of the circumstances of the case, his personality, his station
in life and professional role, could not, even with the degree of conscientious
thought that could be expected of him, perceive the wrongfulness of his act.
Id. at 20.
87. This judgment may be overly harsh, for there are some path-breaking cases
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We do not speak of mistake of law as a defense, though there are
indeed isolated cases in which mistakes of law do bear on the state
of mind required for conviction. In People v. Weiss,"5 for example,
the defendant thought he had the authority to arrest one Wendel and
take him out of the state. The defendant was prosecuted and convicted under a statute defining kidnapping as "wilfully seiz[ing] . . .
another, with intent to cause him, without authority of law, to be...
"89
The New York Court of Appeals resent out of the state . ...
versed the conviction. If the defendant assumed he had arresting authority, the court reasoned, he didn't have the "intent to cause [the
victim], without authority of law, to be . . . sent out of the state";
therefore he was not guilty of the offense as defined by the statute. 0
There are several remarkable features of this decision. First,
there would have been no defense if the statute had read "wilfully
seizing another, without authority of law, with the intent to cause him
to be sent out of the state." Under this version, the defendant would
have had the intent required for conviction; the only difference is that
the phrase "without authority of law" is moved up six words in the
formulation. It is inconceivable that the legislature would have located that phrase with an eye to whether mistakes about arresting authority should or should not constitute a defense. It is hardly exemplary of the judicial craft to place so much reliance on the fortuities
of legislative drafting. Secondly, under the rationale of the decision,
it is wholly immaterial whether the defendant's mistake is reasonable
or unreasonable. Any mistake, even an irrational mistake, would negate the "intent to cause him, without authority of law . . . to be sent
out of the state." It is scarcely sensible to resolve the case on the
basis of a theory that leads to unacceptable results.9 1 And in a systhat seem to acknowledge reasonable mistake of law as a defense. People v. Vogel,
46 Cal. 798, 299 P.2d 850 (1956); Long v. State, 44 Del. 262, 65 A.2d 489 (1949).
The reasoning typically is that a reasonable mistake of law negates the "wrongful intent" or "general criminal intent"-terms that invoke the prestige of the word "intent"
to introduce criteria of culpability into the analysis of liability. Yet these are cases
about the validity of prior divorces in bigamy prosecutions. They would be handily
resolved under stage two of the German development, described in note 83 supra; they
are mistakes extrinsic to the criminal law. Cf. Hopkins v. State, 193 Md. 489, 69
A.2d 456, appeal dismissed, 339 U.S. 940 (1950) (rejecting defense based on patently
reasonable mistake about the applicability of the criminal norm).
88. 276 N.Y. 384, 12 N.E.2d 514 (1938).
89. Id. at 386, 12 N.E.2d at 514 (emphasis omitted).
90. Id. at 3 89-90, 12 N.E.2d at 515-16.
91. The common law seems destined to fluctuate between rejecting all mistakes,
see, e.g., Regina v. Prince, 2 Cr. Cas. Res. 154 (1875), and acknowledging even unreasonable mistakes as a defense on the ground that they negate the requisite intent,
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tern hostile to mistakes of law, it is an odd, unacceptable result to
admit an irrational mistake of arresting authority as a full defense to
the crime of kidnapping. These anomalies in the Weiss opinion
should be enough to despair of this path for resolving the problem

of mistake of law.
Yet there is no competitive approach in the Anglo-American literature.

The Model Penal Code recognizes that relying on certain

kinds of mistaken legal advice should constitute a defense, but the
Code fails to integrate mistake of law into its theoretical structure,
and indeed it discourages any association between mistake of law and

other excusing conditions. 2
It may well be that a legal system must develop some sophistication about the role of excusing conditions before it can engage the
problem of mistake of law. It is only when courts appreciate the difference between excusing conduct and interpreting the law that they
can avoid the snares surrounding mistakes of law. There is a common
law tendency to say that recognizing mistake of law as a defense would
be to allow the defendant to make his own law,9 3 or to recognize a
new exception to the pre-existing rule. But the law does not change
when a jury finds that a man could not have been expected to know
see, e.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952); People v. Weiss, 276 N.Y.
384, 12 N.E.2d 514 (1938). There seems to be no clearly received rationale for both
recognizing a mistake and requiring that it be reasonable. To explain why the mistake
must be reasonable, the courts sometimes confuse the evidentiary requirement that the
defense be reasonably raised with the substantive question of whether the mistake must
be reasonable, see, e.g., United States v. Short, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 437, 16 C.M.R. 11
(1954). Or sometimes the courts hold that the mistake must be reasonable if it is to
negate "criminal intent" or "wrongful intent," see, e.g., People v. Hernandez, 61 Cal.
2d 529, 393 P.2d 673, 39 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1964). It becomes clear why only reasonable mistakes should negate "criminal intent" if one reads the latter to refer generally
to culpability or fault and one takes a reasonable mistake to be one that is free from
fault.
92. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). That the
draftsmen perceive mistake of law to be different is reflected (1) in the specification
of the kinds of situations in which the mistake would constitute a defense without adverting to a principle for including these situations and excluding others, and (2) shifting the burden of persuasion to defendant. Id. § 2.04(4). Cf. id. § 2.09 (defense
of duress based on a broad general principle, with the burden of persuasion on the
prosecution to disprove a properly raised claim).
93. J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAw 383 (2d ed. 1960); Hopkins v. State, 193 Md. 489, 498, 69 A.2d 456, 460, appeal dismissed, 339 U.S. 940
(1950) ("If an accused could be exempted from punishment for crime by reason of the
advice of counsel, such advice would become paramount to the law."). For thoughtful
replies to this argument, see W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, CRIMINAL LAW 368 (1972) (but
the authors also respectfully repeat Jerome Hall's statement of the argument. Id. at
364); Houlgate, Ignorantia Juris: A Pleafor Justice, 78 Enumcs 32, 39 (1967),
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that his conduct was illegal. Suppose that there is a rule prohibiting
the carrying of pocket knives. The accused violates the rule in blissful
ignorance of the illegality of his conduct. The trier-of-fact finds, for
whatever reason, that the accused could not have been expected to
know of the rule, thus that his mistake was reasonable. The accused
is acquitted, but does not the rule remain the same? It would be
odd to say that the court has engrafted an exception onto the rule,
namely that you may carry a pocket knife whenever you reasonably
think that it is legal to do so. By its nature, a rule of law communicates a standard of conduct. It is not part of the rule that you may
carry a pocket knife if you are reasonably mistaken about the law,
for no rule can coherently direct people what to do in the event they
are ignorant of that same rule.9 4 Thus there is an important and subtle difference between modifying a rule and finding that someone who
violated the rule is excused and blameless for having done so. Yet
this distinction has had little impact on common law thinking. And
as a general matter, common law analysts have yet to see that mistake
of law is an excusing condition parallel to necessity, duress and insanity.
Ill.

INDIVIDUALIZATION AND RULES

A recurrent theme in this discussion of the common law posture toward excusing conditions is that the common law, in the mind of its
practitioners, consists of rules and nothing but rules. Judicial decisions must either follow rules or make new rules. Courts can handle
the issue of justification, for recognizing a new justification is but to
acknowledge an additional exception to the rule. Judges can think
about what reasonable men would do, for abstracting the issue from
the accused permits one to think of the case as a recurrent problemthe type of problem that is amenable to solution by rules. What com94. Quaere: What is the imperative not to engage in statutory rape after
People v. Hernandez, 61 Cal. 2d 529, 393 P.2d 673, 39 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1964)
(recognizing reasonable mistake of fact as a defense)? Is it: thou shalt not engage
in intercourse with a girl under the age of 18. Or is it: thou shalt not engage in
intercourse with a girl whom you do not reasonably take to be over the age of 18.
According to the former version, the defense of reasonable mistake functions as an
excuse analogous to mistake of law. Yet the latter version seems to be a plausible
interpretation (if one can decide oneself that one's regarding a girl to be over 18 is
reasonable). According to this view, the reasonable mistake functions not as an excuse
for violating a rule, but as a denial that the rule was violated. This suggests that there
may indeed be a plausible distinction between being mistaken about whether conduct
is prohibited and being mistaken about the circumstances in which one is acting. Mis-

takes of law function as excuses; it is not so clear that mistakes of fact do.
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mon law judges find to be extra-legal are questions about the particular accused: What could we fairly expect him to do under the circumstances? Is he personally to blame for having succumbed to pressure? These questions are not about what the rule ought to be, but
about whether a violation of the rule is fairly attributable to a particular individual. As questions about individuals in unique circumstances, they fall outside the dominant Anglo-American conception of
law. The issue whether an individual is accountable for violating a
rule fails to fit a model of analysis that limits the legal process to defining
rules and determining whether they have been violated.
What the common law lacks is a concept comparable to the German notion of Zumutbarkeit-a term that is roughly translated as attributability or imputability. The German term captures the question
whether an individual can be justly held accountable for violating a
rule. It bears witness to the role of compassion as well as to the
application of rules in the total process of judging an individual accused of crime. 95 Anglo-American lawyers use words like "accountability" and "responsibility" but they come to life only when we speak
of the insanity defense. And the special feature of insanity, as we
have seen, is the tendency to think of the insane as a class apartas people, like infants, who fall outside the ordinary jurisdiction of
the criminal law. 96 There is simply no single term in the idiom of
the common law that helps us focus on the question whether a normal
person is responsible for having violated a legal obligation.
The common law tradition suffers a fundamental paradox. The
tradition purports to be based on case-by-case evolution. In fact, the
courts are systematically averse to considering the peculiarities of particular defendants. They are committed to deciding the ultimate issue
of guilt or innocence according to rules that suppress the differences
among persons and situations. In contrast, the contemporary German
95. But note the German scholars and courts have resisted the recognition of any
general, extra-statutory excuse based on the principle of Zumutbarkeit. Judgment of
Nov. 11, 1932, 66 RGSt. 397, 399 (holding that the courts should not recognize excuses not specified in the criminal code); J. BAUMANN, STRAiECHT: ALLOEmEINER
TEiL 463-65 (5th ed. 1968); H. JESCHECK, LEHRBRUCH DES STRAFrU crs 333 (1969).
Accord, C. PAN § 65 (specifying that conduct may be excused only under conditions
specified in the code). But cf. H. WELzEL, DAs Dau'rscnE ST uAmcFHT 184-86 (11th
ed. 1969) (recognizing a defense of extra-statutory necessity as an excuse, which would
cover the cases of conflict-of-duties discussed in note 30 supra). Cf. also Judgment of
Mar. 18, 1952, 2 BGHSt. 194 (developing a new defense of mistake of law, with the
court stressing that it was up to the judiciary to explicate the implications of requiring
culpability as a condition for conviction).
96. See text accompanying notes 74-80 supra.
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style of thought stresses the centrality of codification and legislative
supremacy in defining prohibited conduct. Yet at the level of assessing individual culpability, the German courts cultivate a system of individualized excusing conditions. The indispensable inquiry in every
case is whether the defendant, as a concrete individual, can be fairly
blamed for having violated the law.
This radical difference between the contemporary common law
and the German styles of legal thought manifests a deeper cleavage
between the two traditions. It is a cleavage that is not likely to be
explained by the conditions of social life, for it is hard to find two
societies more alike than contemporary West Germany and the contemporary United States. The cleavage springs from radically different
perspectives on the nature of law and the ideal of doing justice under
the law. In an effort to approach these divergent perspectives, I shall
try to state the arguments that a common law jurist might offer on
behalf of the practices of his system. Each argument will invite a reply, ,and these replies will bring us close to the alternative view expressed in the German orientation toward the theory of excuses.
A.

THE

ARGUMENT THAT INDIvIDUALIZATION Is

IMPOssIBLE

It is a mistake, this argument would hold, to think that individualization is ever possible. Each decision is made with reference to a perceived set of facts about an individual, his conduct and the surrounding circumstances. This set of facts is always finite. If the decision
is based on a finite set of perceived facts, that set of facts IF 1 , F2,
F3 . . . F } generates a rule. The rule is that whenever F1 , F 2,
Fs . . . F, recurs, the defendant will be acquitted. Individualization, it
follows, is an illusion. Legal acquittals invariably express rules that
may be followed in future cases.
The first response that this argument invites is straightforward
rejection. It is simply not true, one should maintain, that every factual
situation is reducible to a finite set of variables. There is an irreducible uniqueness about every case of succumbing to pressure. There
could never be another case just like Green. No other convict would
be just like him. No other threat would affect an actor the way the
threat of rape affected him.
Yet if one generates a description of the Green situation, one
can imagine the same scenario occurring at another time and place.
The time, place and defendant would be different, but presumably
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these facts would not matter in assessing the involuntariness of the
escape. If the case can be definitively described, and the description
transcends time and place, then one has no difficulty imagining the
described set of facts obtaining in another context.
The individualization of excuses presupposes that each case of
involuntary conduct is unique. Yet to maintain that claim, we are
driven to claiming that the uniqueness consists in some feature of the
case that goes beyond the factual description. The whole, one must
argue, is greater than the sum of its parts: the situation of excused
conduct is more than the sum of its component factors.
Yet this additional feature does not lend itself to articulation.
And one of the first principles of legal decision-making is the commitment to articulating and explaining all that bears on the process of
decision. One then confronts the antinomy of individualization, which
resists verbal explanation, and the processes of the law, which are
premised on the values of publicity and full articulation of the facts
that inform decisions.
Given this conflict between legal values and the virtues of individualization, one would expect that courts would be consistently
averse to deciding cases in their full peculiarity. We have already
noted this aversion in the attitude of common law courts toward excusing conditions. But this attitude, surprisingly, does not pervade the
thinking of American judges. One notable exception is the long line
of Supreme Court cases on the admissibility of allegedly involuntary
confessions. Since the late 1950's the Supreme Court has stressed
that each decision should be rendered on a unique set of facts. The
Court committed itself to deciding each case under the "totality of
the circumstances."' 7 Though the judges specified the facts that
seemed significant in each case, the decisions did not render rules that
police could rely on in conducting subsequent interrogations. The
personality of each individual suspect was too much a part of each
case for the holding to provide a guide to interrogating other persons
under other conditions. If a confession was involuntary, when offered
by a foreign-born suspect after eight hours of interrogation, it might
not be involuntary, if offered by a native-born first year law student.
The problem of generating rules in this field was not simply a function
of the multiplicity of factors. The commitment to deciding under the
97. Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 567 (1958); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S.
191, 197 (1957). See generally Comment, The Coerced Confession Cases in Search
of a Rationale, 31 U. Cm. L. REv. 313, 318 (1964).
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"totality of the circumstances" was itself hostile to the emergence of
rules about permissible police interrogation.
The way to understand the individualization of excusing conditions
is to think of the process of individualization as akin to the assessment
of allegedly coerced confessions in the "totality of the circumstances."
In both instances, the ultimate issue is whether the conduct in question-violating the law or confessing-was undertaken voluntarily.
What is so hard to fathom is that American courts can be so sensitive
to individualization where the problem is the procedural fairness of
relying on a confession, but so clearly averse to the same inquiry when
the issue posed is the fairness of punishing a particular individual.
It is worth recalling that this line of analysis represents an effort
to reply to the argument that individualization is conceptually impossible. The most that we have done is show courts can and do operate
on the assumption that inquiries about voluntariness--of violating the
law or of confessing-may be fitted to the "totality of the circumstances." We have not dispelled the claim that this commitment to
individualization might be an illusion, and that decisions invariably reflect the perception of a finite set of factual variables. To counter
that charge, we should have to argue that the whole is indeed greater
than the sum of its parts, that each situation is indeed greater than
the sum of its components. That would call for a much deeper critique of prevailing conceptions of rational thought. It is a critique
that would require a work of much greater depth and sophistication
than this limited paper on the theory of excuses.
We can, however, make a weaker claim that individualization,
at least in one sense, is conceptually tenable. The argument would
be that an acquittal on grounds of involuntary conduct is tied to the
particular defendant. The acquittal is individualized in the sense that
it fails to set a precedent that can be relied upon by other actors in
the future. To appreciate this point, we should try to imagine the
implications of an acquittal in a case like Green. Would other convicts, caught in comparable conditions of impending rape, be able to
escape in the expectation that they would not be punished upon being
caught? One would think not, for the fact that they expected to be
immune from prosecution would partially undercut their claim that
their conduct was a reactive response to impending danger. Their
escape would come to appear to be attributable less to the present
threat of rape and more to the promise of future immunity in the
courts. On the other hand, after a conviction in a case like Green,
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subsequent escapes would appear to be even more the product of desperation and fear. If the convict fears punishment and he nonetheless
escapes to avoid an impending rape, one senses even more that his
conduct is the involuntary response to the terror of the situation.
Thus, so far as the problem in Green is treated as a matter of
excusing conduct that is not fairly subject to blame,18 the outcome
of the case bears an inverse relationship to the legal situation of actors
who thereafter rely on the decision. If Green is acquitted on grounds
of involuntariness, it becomes more difficult to acquit the next convict
caught in a comparable situation. If Green is convicted, the mere
fact of the conviction lends greater credence to the claims of those
who subsequently claim that they are not to blame for yielding to the
pressure of circumstances. In this weaker sense, excuses are individualized; for the mere fact of publicly excusing conduct under overwhelming pressure injects a new factor into the analysis of subsequent
cases.

In this respect, excusing conditions differ fundamentally from justificatory claims. For the nature of a justification, say self-defense
or necessity, is that it posits a right to cause harm under a defined
set of circumstances. If a court should justify, say, the shooting of
a stray dog to protect children in the neighborhood, it would in effect
generate a new rule of law. Should the same circumstances recur,
actors in the future could rely upon the decision, and guide their conduct accordingly. Excuses, in contrast, do not modify the applicable
legal rule; -they relate to the subsidiary question whether a particular
individual can be held accountable for violating a rule that remains
intact. Yet the fact of excusing changes the array of circumstances
under which similar cases are to be judged in the future. 99 The difference between justifying and excusing conduct, then, proves to be
the difference between a legal process that is distinct from the world
to be judged (the process of justifying conduct), and a legal process
98. Recall that the problem can be assayed within the framework of necessity
as a justification. See text accompanying notes 56-61 supra.
99. It might help in grasping this point to turn again to the coerced confession
cases. Suppose that after the decision in Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959),
another suspect, also 25 years old, foreign-born and as much like Spano as we can
imagine, were interrogated in exactly the same way. The only articulable difference
is that this second suspect knows of the decision in Spano. He confesses expecting
that the confession will be held inadmissible. Under the circumstances his confession
would appear to be relatively more deliberative and voluntary. The expectation of inadmissibility would counteract the factors suggesting involuntary self-incrimination.
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that is symbiotically tied to the world and irreversibly alters the factual
background of succeeding cases (the process of excusing).
B.

THE POSITiviSTIC ARGUMENT

AGAINST INDIVIDUALIZATION

As a hedge against confusing conceptual problems with policy issues,
we have addressed ourselves first to the problem whether individualization is conceptually plausible. As noted, there remains the task of
demonstrating the possibility of individualization in the strong sense;
the proof of this stronger claim awaits the broader inquiry whether
each situation may be viewed as "greater" than the sum of its factoral components. What we have shown is that individualization in
a weaker sense is conceptually tenable; according to this weaker sense,
decisions about involuntariness of conduct become factors in the analysis of subsequent cases based on comparable facts. Thus decisions
about excuses are individualized in the sense that they are limited to
a unique set of facts; the rendering and publicizing of the decision
means that the same decisional context cannot arise again.
In this section of the discussion, I wish to assume the plausibility of individualization, both in the weaker and in the stronger sense.
The point of making the assumption is to broaden the inquiry by
reaching a range of other objections that might be made against the
process of individualizing excusing conditions. The point of all these
objections is to challenge the desirability of individualizing excuses,
even if there is no conceptual barrier to doing so.
The first objection is that there is something characteristically
"unlegal" about individualized decision-making. It might be appropriate to individualize administrative processes, like sentencing and
even the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. But the rule of law presupposes decision-making under rules, and relying on rules runs
against the rigours of individualization.
This is a powerful objection--one that is likely to appeal to many
who would instinctively support the pattern of the contemporary common law. The argument reveals the extent to which the common
law tradition identifies the phenomenon of law with the governance of rules. It bespeaks the essence of legal positivism and thus
in the reply that follows, I shall refer to this strain of fidelity to rules
as the positivist objection.
By way of constructing a reply to the positivist objection, we
should note first that the process of individualization is not conducted

1306

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:1269

without reference to a standard of decision. The standard in the cases
of excuses, as in the case of allegedly coerced confessions, is whether
the individual acted voluntarily under the circumstances. Voluntariness in the context of excuses means: Is the actor culpable for having
succumbed to the pressure of the situation? Or to rephrase the question: Could one fairly and reasonably expect the actor to have resisted
the pressure and to have abstained from violating the law? The standard is patently evaluative. There is no way to resolve the issue of
voluntariness except by appealing to our sense of what we may fairly
demand of each other under specified circumstances.
There is, no doubt, something odd about the claim that an individualized decision can be made under an abstract standard, even an
irreducibly evaluative standard like that of voluntariness. One is invariably puzzled by the process of reasoning from abstract standards
to results in concrete cases. The process is different from applying
the rules of a game or the algorithms of a computer program. It
seems to be part of the legal process as we know it; yet it has yet
to receive an adequate jurisprudential account. 100
To meet the positivist objection at a deeper level, we should recall that the issue of excusing arises only after a determination that
conduct violates the applicable legal norm. As it is formulated in German theory, the issue is whether illegal (rechtswidrige) conduct is
fairly to be attributed to a particular individual. Thus one confronts
an ambiguity about the legal status of excuses. In one sense, excuses
are not decisions under the law (Recht), for they come to play only
after one posits the illegality (Rechtswidrigkeit) of the conduct. The
questions of excusing, therefore, cannot be resolved by appealing to
criteria of the law; for those criteria have already applied in finding
the conduct to be contrary to law.
Yet there is a broad sense of law and the legal process that seemingly encompasses the process of excusing. Excuses bear on guilt or
innocence; the decision whether to excuse or not is a necessary stage
in determining liability under the law. Thus one comes to see that
the process of excusing and assessing blame occupies a hiatus between
100. One response has been that of the rule skeptics who take their cue from
Holmes' famous aphorism, "General propositions do not decide concrete cases," Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Much of contemporary jurisprudence is devoted to the pursuit of alternatives to Holmes' nihilistic
view of the role of rules in legal decision-making. See H.L.A. HART, TH CONCEPT
OF LAw 132-37 (1961); Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. Cm. L. Rlv. 14 (1967).
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two concepts of law. Law in the narrow sense consists solely of the
norms prohibiting conduct and laying down the conditions of justified,
legal conduct. Law in the broad sense consists of the full range of
criteria bearing on liability. It is in this hiatus that one seeks to individualize the judgment of liability by focusing on the individual and
his personal culpability for violating a legal norm.
The thrust of the positivist objection is to banish this hiatus from
the province of the law. For when it is banished, the sovereign of
norms comes to rule over the entire kingdom. Once expelled, individualized determinations of culpability inhabit extra-legal domains.
They are to be found in the discretionary processes of sentencing, pardoning, arresting and choosing to prosecute. The reply to the positivist objection turns on seeing that these borderland and admittedly individualized processes are part of the law itself. The task of the theory of excuses is to bring them within the law, and thus to provide
a public and visible forum for the process of individualized assessment
in the criminal law. There is no doubt that one can achieve individualization in the surrogate settings of prosecutorial charging, sentencing and pardoning. But every legal system, one would think, should
be committed to maximizing that aspect of the criminal process that
is public and subject to reasoned argumentation.
The positivist objection expresses a preference for a minimalist
concept of law, a commitment to the dominance of rules, which leaves
a maximum array of problems to be resolved in semi-secret, administrative processes. Though the prosecutorial bureaucracy may be the
beneficiary of the positivist objection, it is hardly its author. There
are many other biases of the age that militate against an expanded
concept of law, a concept of the legal process that would encompass
individualized excusing conditions as well as norms of conduct.
One of these biases is an empiricist preference for identifying
the law with the collection of discrete official decisions of the system. 1' 1 "The law is what the courts do in fact,"' 1 2 as generations
of Holmes' followers have learned to think. There is no law out there
101. For a good example of this empiricist frame of mind, see Glazebrook, The
Necessity Plea in English Criminal Law, 30 CAMB. L.I. 87, 108 (1972), in which
the author defines a criminal offense to be "the total effect of the judicial decisions
determining the extent of criminal liability in respect of a particular type of conduct."
102. As Holmes originally put it: "The prophecies of what he courts will do in
fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law." Holmes, The Path
of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 460-61 (1897). Cf. K. LLEWELLYN, BRAMBLE
BusH 12 (1930) (defining the law as what "officials do about disputes.")
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-hovering over us as a "brooding omnipresence in the sky."' 10 Yet
the German dualist sense for the legal process presupposes that one
can perceive the violation of a norm, even though that violation has
no practical consequences. The violation is sensed, but it has no pragmatic manifestation. It is like a right without a remedy. As AngloAmerican lawyers have difficulty conceiving of unenforceable rights,
they balk at the concept of unpunishable violations of the criminal
law.
An even deeper bias that buttresses -the positivist objection is the
commitment to policy 'analysis, particularly as it is expressed in American legal circles. The relentless emphasis on policy objectives has
created a condition of mind that sees the rationale of judicial decisions
only in their consequences. A decision is right if and only if its prospective benefits outweigh its prospective burdens. What is lost in
this unqualified embrace of the utilitarian calculus is a sense for the
imperatives implicit in the situation of the parties before the court.
The imperatives of a situation command our attention, not because
our response will maximize utility, but because we have no choice but
to respond 'to the perceived demands of justice. Why do we recognize the constitutional right to a hearing in a criminal case? It is not
because we believe that providing hearings will redound to the longrange benefit of society. 10 4 We affirm a right to a hearing in a criminal case because, as human beings, we know what it means to suffer
condemnation and punishment, and we can imagine the torture of being tried and convicted without the opportunity to answer the accusations against us. Once we identify with the criminal defendant and
grasp that he is one of us, we cannot 'but affirm his right to a hearing.
We respond to the imperative, not because it will inure to society's
benefit, but because we know that not responding will betray what
is human within us.

Excuses do not express policy goals. They respond to an imperative generated by the defendant's situation. Excuses are not levers
for channeling behavior in the future, but an expression of compassion
for one of our kind caught in a maelstrom of circumstance. If we
103. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
104. At least in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932), the Court based its
analysis of a right to a hearing on what it perceived to be an "immutable principle of
justice," rather than on the contingent predicted benefits of allowing defendants to be
heard. From its perception of the right to a hearing the court inferred the now well
developed right to counsel in state criminal trials.
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sense that we would escape from prison to avoid a homosexual rape,
do we have any choice but to acquit an escapee like Green? Should
it matter whether the net impact of acquitting Green might be to
undermine discipline in the prisons and produce a net social loss?
Yet so long as we think of law as the pursuit of policies, we are
inclined to think the probable consequences of our decision ought
to mediate our sense of justice to the individual accused. The instrumentalist bias of the times thus converts the doing of justice into
one among many policies, to be weighed and assessed along with the
value of maintaining discipline in the prisons. This way of thinking
about justice is so well entrenched in contemporary American legal
thought that most students of the law find it hard to conceive of justice
or compassion as an imperative, a demand to which we must respond
without a view to the overall costs of our response.
There may be no compelling way to dispel the biases of empiricism and instrumentalist legal reasoning. There may be no definitive
reply to the positivist preference for a legal system based on rules.
The process of objection and reply must end with a sigh of resigiation
rather than the exhilaration of victory. The positivist can parry our
every thrust. Yet his agile swordplay betrays a master we may not
wish to accept. He serves a sovereign who rules from above and dominates his subjects with rules. If there is tolerance for individual
weakness it is expressed in the processes of charging, sentencing, and
pardoning. Yet the quest for a government of equals may lead us
to reject a system of justice that depends so heavily on prosecutorial
discretion and executive mercy. We may yet come to see the virtue
of incorporating criteria of compassion into the criminal law. We shall
then choose a public system of excuses instead of a semi-secret system
of administrative grace. And then we shall understand that individualizing excuses complements rather than detracts from the rule of
law.

